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Abstract
We develop a 3-period overlapping generations (OLG) model where in-
dividuals borrow at the young age to nance their education. Education
does not only increase future wages, but, also, raises the duration of life,
which, in turn, a¤ects education choices, in line with Ben Porath (1967).
We rst identify conditions that guarantee the existence of a stationary
equilibrium with perfect foresight. Then, we reexamine the conditions
under which the Ben-Porath e¤ect prevails, and emphasize the impact of
human capital decay and preferences. We compare the laissez-faire with
the social optimum, and show that the latter can be decentralized pro-
vided the laissez-faire capital stock corresponds to the one satisfying the
modied Golden Rule. Finally, we introduce intracohort heterogeneity
in the learning ability, and we show that, under asymmetric information,
the second-best optimal non-linear tax scheme involves a downward distor-
tion in the level of education of less able types, which, quite paradoxically,
would reinforce the longevity gap in comparison with the laissez-faire.
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1 Introduction
During the last decades, economists have paid a large attention to the rela-
tions between economic development and demographic trends. Within classical
growth theory, a strong emphasis was laid on the link between population growth
and economic growth. Whereas Solow (1956) emphasized the capital dilution
e¤ect, by which population growth reduces the sustainable level of capital and
output per head, Samuelson (1975) emphasized, in an overlapping generations
economy (OLG), that population growth can induce an age structure favorable
for long-run standards of living (i.e. the intergenerational redistribution e¤ect).
The relation between population growth and development is also at the center of
the literature on fertility choices, which examined trade-o¤s between the quan-
tity and the quality of children, and, hence, between population growth and
long-run development (Barro and Becker 1989, Ehrlich and Lui 1991). Besides
those analyses, the endogenous growth literature emphasized the occurrence of
scale e¤ects arising thanks to externalities in production (Romer 1990) or in
knowledge (Kremer 1993). Finally, in the recent unied growth theory, thresh-
olds in population sizes play a key role in the explanation of regime shifts from
the Malthusian to the Modern growth regime (Galor and Moav 2002, 2005).
More recently, a strong emphasis was laid on the impact of survival condi-
tions on economic development. The general intuition behind that literature
consists in the simple idea that an improvement of survival conditions, by in-
creasing the expected life span of economic agents, is likely to modify their
decisions, in such a way as to encourage the accumulation of physical capital
(through a higher propensity to save) and the accumulation of human capital
(through a longer enjoyment of education returns). The starting point of that
literature is the seminal contribution by Ben Porath (1967). Ben Porath argued
that a rise in life expectancy tends to increase the lifetime returns from edu-
cational investment, and, hence, tends to encourage individual investments in
education. As a consequence of this e¤ect, improvements in survival conditions
are expected to lead to an increase in education, and, hence, to favor human
capital accumulation and growth.
The so-called Ben-Porath e¤ect has given rise, in the recent years, to a signif-
icant literature, both at the theoretical and empirical levels. On the theoretical
side, a rst group of articles examined the impact of an exogenous change in
survival conditions on education and growth. Ehrlich and Lui (1991) showed, by
means of a 3-period OLG model with endogenous fertility and education chosen
by parents, that an improvement of survival conditions for children could, by
reducing the chosen fertility, favor education investment and economic growth.
On the basis of a OLG model with vintage human capital, Boucekkine et al
(2002) showed that an improvement of survival conditions has three distinct
e¤ects on human capital accumulation and growth. First, better survival condi-
tions increase the number of workers (i.e. pure quantity e¤ect). Second, better
survival conditions increase the expected lifespan during which workers can ben-
et from education returns, which favors higher education levels, and, hence,
stimulates human capital accumulation and growth. This second e¤ect is noth-
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ing less than the Ben-Porath e¤ect. Third, better survival conditions increase
the average age of workers, which reduces workers average productivity (be-
cause of the depreciation of the skills), and has a negative e¤ect on growth. The
overall e¤ect of an improvement of survival conditions varies with the relative
sizes of those three e¤ects. More recently, Ludwig and Vogel (2010) developed
an OLG model with physical capital accumulation and risky lifetime to examine
how aging can lead to increased educational e¤orts. They numerically showed
that the e¤ect of a changing lifetime labor supply tends to increase the optimal
education, although the increase of e¤ective labor decreases capital-labor ratio
and hence has a dampening e¤ect on education.
Still at the theoretical levels, recent papers examined the relation between
education and life expectancy in a setting where not only does life expectancy
a¤ect education, but where education a¤ects life expectancy. The underlying
intuition is to focus not only on the e¤ect of an exogenous change in survival
conditions on education, but, rather, to study a system where higher education
levels contribute to improve survival conditions, which, in turn, a¤ect educa-
tion decisions. As shown in several papers, the introduction of that feedback
e¤ect complicates the analysis of the Ben-Porath e¤ect, and may lead to the
occurrence of poverty and demographic traps (see Blackburn and Cipriani 2002,
Chakraborty 2004, Cervelatti and Sunde 2005, Soares 2005). Several variants
of that theoretical framework were developed, including, in particular, di¤erent
assumptions regarding the education decision. Whereas de la Croix and Lican-
dro (2013) develop a model where parents choose the quantity and the quality of
their children (determining their longevity), Leker and Ponthiere (2015) study
the Ben-Porath e¤ect in an economy where education is determined by intrafa-
milial bargaining between parents and children.
On the empirical side, various studies aimed at testing whether life ex-
pectancy improvements a¤ect economic growth. This e¤ect may not be due
to the Ben-Porath e¤ect, since life expectancy may a¤ect growth through other
channels (e.g. saving). But the Ben-Porath e¤ect could explain, in theory, a
positive impact of life expectancy growth on economic growth. Bloom et al
(2004) show that a 5-year increase in life expectancy generates a 21 % rise of
the growth rate.1 Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) found that, once adequate
instruments are used to avoid endogeneity biases, life expectancy does not seem
to a¤ect economic growth. Hazan (2009) argued that the Ben-Porath e¤ect can
only arise provided additional life-years are years of occupation, which has not
been observed. On the contrary, de la Croix et al (2009) nd, for Sweden, that
the longevity increase accounts for 20 % of the rise in education over the last
two centuries. More recently, Bloom et al (2013) have criticized Acemoglu and
Johnsons approach, on the ground that they neglect the impact of initial condi-
tions. Cervelatti and Sunde (2011) argued also against Acemoglu and Johnson
(2007) that, once we take into account di¤erences between countries in terms of
fertility, it appears that life expectancy increases economic growth in countries
1Similar e¤ects are found in Bloom and Sachs (1998), Bloom and Williamson (1998), and
Gallup and Sachs (2001).
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having accomplished their demographic transition.
Those mixed empirical results suggest that, although the Ben-Porath e¤ect
is theoretically plausible, that e¤ect is far from being universally observed. On
the contrary, its size depends on various kinds of determinants. In particular,
Hazans (2009) criticism suggests that the plausibility of the Ben-Porath e¤ect
should be assessed in a theoretical model where the retirement age is not ex-
ogenous, but, rather, where individuals decide when they retire. Moreover, the
fact that the occurrence of the Ben-Porath e¤ect varies across countries suggests
that more attention should be paid, when analyzing the Ben-Porath e¤ect, to
the impact of cultural factors, such as preferences, on educational choices.
Besides those theoretical and empirical studies on the Ben-Porath e¤ect,
little emphasis has been laid, so far, on the policy implications of the Ben-Porath
e¤ect. There have been few attempts to examine the design of the optimal
subsidy on education in an economy where the Ben-Porath e¤ect is at work. In
particular, it is widely acknowledged that education constitutes a major vector
of inequalities within the society, and that inequalities in life expectancy and
in education are strongly related (see Deboosere et al. 2009). This connexion
between education and life expectancy is conform with the Ben-Porath e¤ect.
But few attempts were made to derive the optimal public intervention in an
economy where education and life expectancy are correlated.
The goal of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we propose to reexamine the Ben-
Porath e¤ect in a dynamic OLG model where individuals choose their education,
their saving and the age at which they retire, and where the duration of their life
depends on the amount of education. Following Boucekkine et al (2002), who
emphasized that the Ben-Porath e¤ect depends on the depreciation of human
capital, we assume that there exists some decay of human capital, which may
a¤ect education decisions. We use that microeconomic model to identify the
determinants of the Ben-Porath e¤ect, and, in particular, the impact of pref-
erences (attitudes towards risk and towards labor) on the Ben-Porath e¤ect.
Secondly, we use that setting to study the design of the optimal public policy in
a Ben-Porath economy. For that purpose, we rst consider the decentralization
of the social optimum in an economy composed of homogeneous agents. Then,
we introduce heterogeneity within cohorts regarding the learning ability of in-
dividuals, and we study the optimal public intervention in a second-best setting
where individual learning ability is not observed by the government.
Anticipating on our results, we rst identify, in our Ben-Porath economy,
conditions that guarantee the existence of a stationary equilibrium with per-
fect foresight, and we compare those conditions in the cases of exogenous and
endogenous longevity. Then, we reexamine the conditions under which the Ben-
Porath e¤ect prevails, and emphasize the impact of human capital decay and
preferences. Here again, we distinguish between the cases where longevity is
exogenous and where education increases longevity. We compare the laissez-
faire with the social optimum, and show that the latter can be decentralized
provided the laissez-faire capital stock corresponds to the one satisfying the
modied Golden Rule. Finally, we introduce intracohort heterogeneity in the
learning ability, and we show that, under asymmetric information, the second-
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best optimal non-linear tax scheme involves a downward distortion in the level
of education of less able types, which, quite paradoxically, would reinforce the
longevity gap in comparison with the laissez-faire.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
The temporary equilibrium is characterized in Section 3. Section 4 studies the
conditions under which a stationary equilibrium with perfect foresight exists.
Section 5 examines, at the stationary equilibrium with perfect foresight, the
determinants of the Ben-Porath e¤ect. The social optimum is characterized in
Section 6. Section 7 examines the second-best problem when the population is
heterogeneous in terms of learning capacity. Section 8 concludes.
2 The model
Let us consider a three-period OLG model. Period 1 is childhood, during which
children borrow in order to invest an amount e in their higher education. During
period 2, individuals work, pay back the cost of their education, consume and
save some resources. Period 3 is the old age. Whereas the durations of periods 1
and 2 are normalized to unity, the duration of period 3 is equal to ` (0 < ` < 1).2
During period 3, individuals work some fraction z and consume their saving.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider here an economy composed of identical
individuals.3
Demography Fertility is exogenous, and equal to its replacement level.
There is no risk about the duration of life. Survival curves are perfectly rectan-
gular. However, the duration of the old age varies over time, as a function of
the educational level enjoyed during the childhood, according to the following
function:
`t+1 = ` (et 1) (1)
where ` (0) = ` > 0, `0 (et 1) > 0 and `00 (et 1) < 0. We also assume that
limet 1!0 `
0 (et 1) = +1, limet 1!+1 `0 (et 1) = 0 and limet 1!1 ` (et 1) =
`< 1.
Production Production takes place with physical capital and e¤ective la-
bor, according to a production function with constant returns to scale:
Yt = F (Kt; Lt) (2)
where Kt denotes the stock of capital at time t, while Lt is the total amount of
e¤ective labor, equal to:
Lt = htNt + ztht 1Nt 1 (3)
2Alternatively, we could here consider survival probabilities dependent on education. This
would imply introducing an annuity market. Further, it would face Bommiers critique of risk
neutrality with respect to the length of life (see Bommier 2007).
3The case of heterogeneous individuals is discussed in Section 7.
5
and F () exhibits constant returns to scale, htNt is the number of e¤ective labor
units from young workers at time t, where ht denotes the stock of human capital
for each young worker at time t, and Nt is the number of young workers at time
t. Moreover, ztht 1Nt 1 amounts to the number of e¤ective labor units from
old workers at time t. This number depends on the retirement age zt, as well
as on the human capital decay, which is captured by the parameter . When
there is no decay, we have  = 1. On the contrary, when there is some strong
decay,  is close to 0. Under CRS, and given Nt 1 = Nt = N , the production
process can be written as:
~yt =
Yt
N
= F

~kt; ht + ztht 1

(4)
where ~yt  YtN is the output per young worker and ~kt  KtN is the capital per
young worker.
Physical capital and borrowing for childrens education investment are -
nanced on the basis of individual saving. We assume that capital fully depreci-
ates after one period of use. Given that only the young save for their old days,
the capital-market clearing condition takes, in aggregated terms, the form:
Kt+1+Net = Nst (5)
Let us dene capital per e¤ective working unit as kt  KtLt . Hence we have:
kt+1 =
Kt+1
Nh(et 1) +Nzth(et 2)
(6)
We can thus rewrite the capital accumulation equation in per e¤ective working
units terms as:
kt+1 =
N(st et)
Nh(et 1) +Nzth(et 2)
=
st et
h(et 1) + zth(et 2)
(7)
where st denotes the saving of each young adult.
Regarding the accumulation of human capital, we assume that the level of
human capital depends on the amount of education investment at the young
age, according to the relation:
ht = h (et 1) (8)
with h(0) = 1, h0 (et 1) > 0 and h00 (et 1) < 0. An investment et in ed-
ucation at the young age yields a human capital ht equal to h (et 1) at the
young age, and a human capital h (et 1) at the old age. We assume also that
limet 1!0 h
0 (et 1) = +1 and that limet 1!+1 h0 (et 1) = 0.
The economy is perfectly competitive. Workers and capital holders take the
market prices as given. The wage rate wt is equal to the marginal productivity
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of labor, whereas the interest factor Rt is equal to the marginal productivity of
capital:
wt = FL(Kt; Lt) (9)
Rt = FK(Kt; Lt) (10)
Given CRS, we have that F (Kt; Lt) = LtF (KtLt ; 1) = Ltf(kt), so that:
wt = FL(Kt; Lt) = f(kt)  ktf 0(kt) (11)
Rt = FK(Kt; Lt) = f
0(kt): (12)
We assume that limk!0 f 0(k) = +1 and limk!+1 f 0(k) = 0.
Preferences Individuals derive some welfare from consumption during pe-
riods 2 and 3. There is no direct disutility of education, in the sense that the
only disutility from education comes from the foregone consumption due to -
nancing education at the young age. At the old age, there is some disutility of
labor. For the sake of analytical convenience, individual lifetime welfare for a
young adult at time t is represented by the following function:
Ut = u (ct) + `t+1u (dt+1) (13)
where ct denotes consumption in period 2, and dt+1 denotes consumption at the
old age. It is dened as:
dt+1 =
~dt+1   v (zt+1; `t+1)
`t+1
(14)
where ~dt+1 denotes the material resources consumed in period 3, whereas v (zt+1; `t+1)
denotes the disutility of old-age labor, which is here expressed in monetary
terms, as something that reduces the amount of consumption enjoyed at the old
age.
It is assumed that the monetary disutility of old-age labor is increasing in the
retirement age zt+1, and decreasing with the duration of the old age `t+1. The
underlying intuition is that the shorter the old-age, the larger is the disutility
from old age labor. On the contrary, the longer the old age, the lower is the
disutility of old age labor. We thus have: vz (zt+1; `t+1) > 0, vzz (zt+1; `t+1) > 0,
and v` (zt+1; `t+1) < 0. For the sake of simplicity, we will use the following
quadratic function for the disutility of old-age labor:
v (zt+1; `t+1) =
(zt+1)
2
2`t+1
(15)
where  > 0 reects the more or less large marginal disutility of old-age labor.
We have v` (zt+1; `t+1) =
 (zt+1)22
(2`t+1)
2 and v`` (zt+1; `t+1) =
(zt+1)
222(2`t+1)2
(2`t+1)
4 >
0.
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Resource constraints Young individuals need to borrow to nance their
education, and need thus to pay this back when they start to work. Denoting
the interest factor by Rt, the budget constraint at the young age can be written
as:
ct = wth (et 1)  et 1Rt   st (16)
whereas the budget constraint at the old age is:
~dt+1 = zt+1wt+1h (et 1) +Rt+1st (17)
3 Temporary equilibrium
This section characterizes the temporary equilibrium of our economy. For that
purpose, we will proceed in two stages. We will rst consider the case where
longevity is exogenous, and, then, the case where longevity is endogenous.
In each case, individuals choose the education investment, their saving as
well as their retirement age, conditionally on their resource constraints, and
conditionally on some beliefs regarding future factor prices (wages and interest
rates), with superscript e.
3.1 Exogenous longevity
In the case where longevity is purely exogenous, i.e. `t = `, the problem of
agents can be written as:
max
et 1;st;zt+1
u [wth(et 1)  et 1Rt   st]+`u

zt+1w
e
t+1h(et 1)  v(zt+1; `) +Ret+1st
`

The rst-order conditions (FOCs) are:
u0(ct) = Ret+1u
0(dt+1) (18)
wet+1h(et 1) = vz(zt+1; `) (19)
u0(dt+1)

zt+1w
e
t+1h
0(et 1)

= u0(ct) [Rt   wth0(et 1)] (20)
Hence we have:
u0(ct) = Ret+1u
0(dt+1) (21)
zt+1 = w
e
t+1h(et 1) ` (22)
Ret+1wth
0(et 1) + 2
 
wet+1
2
h(et 1) `h0(et 1) = Ret+1Rt (23)
The last condition equalizes the marginal welfare gains from extending ed-
ucation investment with the marginal cost of education. The marginal welfare
gain from increasing education concerns both periods 2 and 3, and goes through
two channels. On the one hand, a higher education level increases the level of
hourly labor earnings in periods 2 and 3, for a given retirement age in period 3.
Note that, in period 3, that e¤ect is mitigated by the decay of human capital.
On the other hand, a higher education level tends to increase the retirement age
in period 3.
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Proposition 1 Given the anticipated levels of future factor prices wet+1 and
Ret+1, the temporary equilibrium under exogenous longevity is a vector
(et 1; ct; st; dt+1; zt+1; wt; Rt;Kt; Lt) satisfying the conditions:
ct = wth (et 1)  et 1Rt   st
dt+1 =
zt+1w
e
t+1h (et 1) +Rt+1st   v
 
zt+1; `

`
u0(ct) = Ret+1u
0(dt+1)
zt+1 = w
e
t+1h(et 1) `
Ret+1Rt = h
0(et 1)
h
2
 
wet+1
2
h(et 1) `+Ret+1wt
i
Lt = ht(et 1)Nt + ztht 1(et 2)Nt 1
Kt = N(st 1 et 1)
wt = FL(Kt; Lt)
Rt = FK(Kt; Lt)
If limet 1!0 h
0 (et 1) = +1 and limet 1!+1 h0 (et 1) = 0, there exists an
interior optimal level of et 1.
If h(et 1) satises
jh00(et 1)j
h0(et 1)
> h
0(et 1)
h(et 1)
for all et 1, then that interior optimal
level for et 1 is unique.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 states conditions that guarantee that the optimal education
level is interior and is unique. Note that, whereas the interiority conditions
constitute some form of classical Inada conditions, the uniqueness condition is
far stronger. To illustrate this, let us take the case of an isoelastic function
h(et 1), satisfying h(0) = 1; h0() > 0 and h00() < 0. We have:
h(et 1) =
e1 t 1
1   + 1
with 0 <  < 1. The derivatives yield:
h0(et 1) = e
 
t 1 > 0
h00(et 1) =  e  1t 1 < 0
Hence the uniqueness condition requires:
e  1t 1
 
e1 t 1
1   + 1
!
> e 2t 1 :
This is equivalent to:
e 1t 1 >

1  2
 (1  )

;
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which is true for all levels of e 1t 1 when  > 1=2. However, if   1=2, then the
RHS exceeds the LHS for et 1 su¢ ciently large.
Hence, the condition on h(et 1) guaranteeing the uniqueness of the optimal
education level is not trivial. Whereas this result may seem surprising given the
simplicity of the assumption, remind that the FOC for optimal education is:
h0(et 1)
h
2
 
wet+1
2
h(et 1) `+Ret+1wt
i
= Ret+1Rt
Given the product h0(et 1)
h
2
 
wet+1
2
h(et 1) `+Ret+1wt
i
on the LHS of
that condition, it is not so surprising that, for a given RHS, various levels of
education et 1 can satisfy that condition. When et 1 increases, h0(et 1) de-
creases, but h(et 1) increases. Hence, without imposing conditions on h(et 1),
it seems di¢ cult to guarantee the uniqueness of the optimal education level.
The condition jh00(et 1)jh(et 1) > [h0(et 1)]2 guarantees that the LHS of the
FOC is strictly decreasing in et 1 for all levels of et 1, and, hence, guarantees
the uniqueness of the level of et 1 for which the LHS equals the RHS of the
FOC.
3.2 Endogenous longevity
The problem faced by the individual is now:
max
et 1;st;zt+1
(
u [wth(et 1)  et 1Rt   st]
+` (et 1)u
h
zt+1w
e
t+1h(et 1) v(zt+1;`(et 1))+Ret+1st
`(et 1)
i )
FOCs are:
u0 (ct) = Ret+1u
0 (dt+1) (24)
wet+1h(et 1) = vz(zt+1; ` (et 1)) (25)
u0(ct) [Rt   wth0(et 1)] = `0 (et 1)u(dt+1)
+u0(dt+1)

zt+1w
e
t+1h
0(et 1)
 v`(zt+1; ` (et 1))`0 (et 1)

(26)
 u0(dt+1)`
0 (et 1)
` (et 1)

zt+1w
e
t+1h(et 1)
 v(zt+1; ` (et 1)) +Ret+1st

Hence we have:
u0 (ct) = Ret+1u
0 (dt+1) (27)
zt+1 = w
e
t+1h(et 1)` (et 1) (28)
u0(ct) [Rt   wth0(et 1)] = u0(dt+1)zt+1wet+1h0(et 1)
+`0 (et 1)

u(dt+1)  u0(dt+1)dt+1
 u0(dt+1)v`(zt+1; ` (et 1))

(29)
Note here an additional determinant of the optimal education time. Unlike
under exogenous longevity, a higher amount of education raises ` (et 1), which
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constitutes an additional motive for spending on education, provided the terms
in brackets are positive, which is generally assumed in the literature.
Let us denote FR  u0(d)du(d) . FR is called the fear of ruin, which is a measure
of risk aversion often used in the literature of the value of life (see Eeckhoudt and
Pestieau (2008)). In the following, we assume that FR is a positive constant.
It is generally assumed to be less than unity (0 < FR < 1).
The FOC for education can be rewritten as:
h0(et 1)
h
2
 
wet+1
2
h(et 1)` (et 1) +Ret+1wt
i
+`0 (et 1)

dt+1

1
FR
  1

  v`(zt+1; ` (et 1))

= Ret+1Rt (30)
Proposition 2 characterizes the temporary equilibrium under endogenous
longevity.
Proposition 2 Given the anticipated levels of future factor prices wet+1 and
Ret+1, the temporary equilibrium under endogenous longevity is a vector
(et 1; ct; st; dt+1; zt+1; wt; Rt;Kt; Lt) satisfying the conditions:
ct = wth (et 1)  et 1Rt   st
dt+1 =
zt+1w
e
t+1h (et 1) +Rt+1st   v (zt+1; `(et 1))
`(et 1)
u0(ct) = Ret+1u
0(dt+1)
zt+1 = w
e
t+1h(et 1)` (et 1)
Ret+1Rt =
"
h0(et 1)
h
2
 
wet+1
2
h(et 1)` (et 1) +Ret+1wt
i
+`0 (et 1)

dt+1
 
1
FR
  1  v`(zt+1; ` (et 1))
#
Lt = ht(et 1)Nt + ztht 1(et 2)Nt 1
Kt = N(st 1 et 1)
wt = FL(Kt; Lt)
Rt = FK(Kt; Lt)
If limet 1!0 h
0 (et 1) = +1, limet 1!+1 h0 (et 1) = 0, limet 1!0 `0 (et 1) =
+1 and limet 1!+1 `0 (et 1) = 0, there exists an interior optimal level of et 1.
If 0 < FR < 1, and if h() and ` () satisfy: jh00(et 1)jh(et 1)` (et 1) >
(h0(et 1))
2
` (et 1) + 2h0(et 1)h(et 1)`0 (et 1), then the interior optimal level of
et 1 is unique.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that, in comparison with Proposition 1, the uniqueness of an interior
optimal level of education depends not only on the properties of the education
return function h(), but, also, on the shape of the longevity function ` (). In
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the exogenous case, we had `0 (et 1) = 0, so that the above condition collapses
to jh00(et 1)j
h0(et 1)
>
h0(et 1)
h(et 1)
as in Proposition 1. However, in the endogenous case, `0 (et 1) > 0 and thus
the condition becomes also dependent on the shape of `0 (et 1).
4 Existence of a stationary equilibrium
This section examines the conditions under which there exists a stationary equi-
librium in our economy. For that purpose, we will, as above, distinguish between
the two cases, where longevity is either exogenous or endogenous.
4.1 Exogenous longevity
To examine the existence of a stationary optimum under exogenous longevity,
remind rst that the problem of the individual is:
max
et 1;st;zt+1
u [wth(et 1)  et 1Rt   st]+`u

zt+1w
e
t+1h(et 1)  v(zt+1; `) +Ret+1st
`

so that the FOCs yield, given v(zt+1; `) =
(zt+1)
2
2 `
:
u0(ct) = Ret+1u
0(dt+1) (31)
h0(et 1)
h
2
 
wet+1
2
h(et 1) `+Ret+1wt
i
= Ret+1Rt (32)
From the rst FOC, we can rewrite optimal saving per young adult as a
function of present and future factor prices, as well as the education level:
st  s
 
wt; Rt; w
e
t+1; R
e
t+1; et 1

Indeed, given some values for parameters `, ,  and some functional forms
for u () and h (), saving depends only on education and present and expected
future factor prices.
Regarding the education choice, we can, under the conditions for existence
and uniqueness provided in Proposition 1, rewrite the optimal education as a
function of present and future factor prices:
et 1  e
 
wt; Rt; w
e
t+1; R
e
t+1

Indeed, given some values for parameters `, ,  and some functional forms for
u () and h (), the chosen level of education depends only on present and ex-
pected future factor prices. We also know from our conditions that this optimal
education level is unique.
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Hence, given that the optimal education depends only on present and future
factor prices, we can deduce that saving per young adult can be rewritten as:
st  s
 
wt; Rt; w
e
t+1; R
e
t+1; e
 
wt; Rt; w
e
t+1; R
e
t+1

 S  wt; Rt; wet+1; Ret+1
Given that factor prices obviously depend on the level of kt, since wt =
f(kt)   ktf 0(kt) and Rt = f 0(kt), the capital accumulation equation can be
written in intensive terms (i.e. per e¤ective unit of labor) as:
kt+1 =
S
 
w(kt); R(kt); w(k
e
t+1); R(k
e
t+1)
 et
h(et 1) + zth(et 2)
(33)
Substituting for the optimal retirement age wth(et 2) ` yields:
kt+1 =
S
 
w(kt); R(kt); w(k
e
t+1); R(k
e
t+1)
 et
h(et 1) + 2w(kt) [h(et 2)]
2
 `
(34)
At the same time, education depends on present and future expected factor
prices:
et 1  e
 
w(kt); R(kt); w(k
e
t+1); R(k
e
t+1)

(35)
We are thus in presence of a two dimensional system with three time lags.
Let us explore the conditions under which a stationary equilibrium with
perfect foresight can exist. Under such an equilibrium, we have ket+1 = kt+1 =
kt = k, and et = et 1 = et 2 = e, so that the pair (e; k) must satisfy:
k =
S (w(k); R(k); w(k); R(k)) e
h(e) + 2w(k) [h(e)]
2
 `

~S (k) e
h(e) + 2w(k) [h(e)]
2
 `
(36)
e  e (w(k); R(k); w(k); R(k))  e (k) (37)
To examine the existence of such a pair, let us study some properties of those
two relations. The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the existence and uniqueness conditions of Propo-
sition 1 hold. Denote the level of e satisfying h(e)

1 + 2w(k) [h(e)]  `

+ ek =
~S(k)
k for a given k by e (k). Suppose that the level of k > 0 such that e (k) = 0
is unique. Suppose also that e(k) is continuous in k, with e0(0) > e0(0) and
e(0)  0. Then a stationary equilibrium (kE ; eE) that satises (36) and (37)
with kE > 0 exists.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 states conditions that are su¢ cient for existence of a stationary
equilibrium with perfect foresight. It should be stressed that Proposition 3
relies on the conditions for a unique interior optimal education level stated in
Proposition 1. Those conditions allow us to write education as a function e (k),
which assigns to each level of k a unique level for educational investment. In the
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Appendix we show that e0(k) > 0 and e(0) = 0. For e(k), see Figure 1. Figure 1.a
illustrates the LHS of (36) (a 45 degree line) and the RHS of (36) with di¤erent
levels of e. The dotted curve denotes the case when e = 0 (h(e) = 1). At
k = ka > 0, the capital-market clears. In the gure there is another intersection
at k = 0: this corresponds to an unstable steady-state in the OLG model. With
higher levels of e, the curve that represents the RHS of (36) shifts down since the
RHS of (36) is decreasing in e (higher e decreases the numerator4 and increases
the denominator). Accordingly, the stable solution, starting from k = ka, goes
to the left; on the other hand, the unstable solution, starting from k = 0, goes
to the right.5 The curve in bold in Figure 1.a corresponds to the critical value of
e  eb, above which the RHS does not have an intersection with the 45 degree
line. In Figure 1.b, the solid downward curve is the stable solutions, and the
dotted upward curve is the unstable solutions. They meet at k = kb  e 1(eb).6
The curve in bold in Figure 1.b is e(k) in equation (37). With the assumptions
of the proposition the intersection of e(k) and e(k) with k > 0 exists.
Several remarks are in order. First, the intersection in Figure 1.b may be at
the downward curve (stable solutions) or at the dotted upward curve (unstable
solutions). Intuitively, if the education demandalong e(k) cannot be a¤orded
in the capital market along k 2 [kb; ka], then the intersection may be at the
dotted curve. In either case, as in Phelps and Shells (1969) growth model with
the governments debt, the equilibrium level of k could be higher or lower than
that of the Modied Golden Rule that we introduce later in this paper. Sec-
ond, note that Proposition 3 only informs us about the existence of a stationary
equilibrium with perfect foresight, but does not inform us about the unique-
ness. Uniqueness can only be examined provided particular functional forms
are imposed for production, utility and education returns. The next subsec-
tion examines existence of a stationary equilibrium with perfect foresight once
education increases longevity.
4 In the Appendix we show that st is decreasing in et under exogenous longevity (equation
(84) in the proof of Proposition 2 when `0(e) = 0). This also reinforces the capital market
tightening.
5This multiplicity of the capital-market equilibrium (with given e) is normal, and it is
indeed very similar to Phelps and Shell (1969, Figure 2). The education investment e here
corresponds to the governments debt in Phelps and Shell (1969), and their classical and
anticlassical ranges correspond to our stable and unstable solutions, respectively.
6 In Figure 1.b, it is reasonable to assume continuity of the solid downward curve since all
relevant functions are continuous and di¤erentiable. Same for the dotted upward curve, and
these two curves meet at (k; e) = (kb; eb) at which the continuity is assured.
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Figure 1: Existence of a stationary equilibrium.
4.2 Endogenous longevity
To examine the conditions under which a stationary equilibrium with perfect
foresight exists, let us remind that the problem faced by the agent in the en-
dogenous longevity case is:
max
et 1;st;zt+1
(
u [wth(et 1)  et 1Rt   st]
+` (et 1)u
h
zt+1wt+1h(et 1) v(zt+1;`(et 1))+Rt+1st
`(et 1)
i )
First-order conditions yield, under v(zt+1; `) =
(zt+1)
2
2`(et 1)
:
u0 (ct) = Rt+1u0 (dt+1) (38)
Ret+1Rt = h
0(et 1)
h
2
 
wet+1
2
h(et 1)` (et 1) +Ret+1wt
i
+
`0 (et 1)
u0(dt+1)

u(dt+1)  u0(dt+1)dt+1
 u0(dt+1)v`(zt+1; ` (et 1))

(39)
From the rst FOC, we can, as above, rewrite optimal saving per young
adult as a function of present and future factor prices, as well as the education
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level:
st  s^
 
wt; Rt; w
e
t+1; R
e
t+1; et 1

Indeed, given some values for parameters ,  and some functional forms
for u () and h (), saving depends only on education and present and expected
future factor prices.
Regarding the education choice, we can, under the conditions for existence
and uniqueness provided in Proposition 2, rewrite the optimal education as a
function of present and future factor prices, as well as saving:
et 1  e^
 
wt; Rt; w
e
t+1; R
e
t+1; st

Indeed, given some values for parameters ,  and some functional forms for u ()
and h (), the chosen level of education depends only on present and expected
future factor prices, and on the saving level. We also know from our conditions
that this optimal education level is unique. Given that st  s^
 
wt; Rt; w
e
t+1; R
e
t+1; et 1

,
we can rewrite the education relation as:
et 1  e^
 
wt; Rt; w
e
t+1; R
e
t+1; s^
 
wt; Rt; w
e
t+1; R
e
t+1; et 1

The capital accumulation equation can be written in intensive terms as:
kt+1 =
s^
 
wt; Rt; w
e
t+1; R
e
t+1; et 1
 et
h(et 1) + zth(et 2)
(40)
Substituting for the optimal retirement age wth(et 2) ` yields:
kt+1 =
s^
 
wt; Rt; w
e
t+1; R
e
t+1; et 1
 et
h(et 1) + 2w(kt) [h(et 2)]
2
` (e)
(41)
At the same time, education depends on present and future expected factor
prices and saving:
et 1 = e^
 
wt; Rt; w
e
t+1; R
e
t+1; s^
 
wt; Rt; w
e
t+1; R
e
t+1; et 1

(42)
We are thus in presence of a two dimensional system with three time lags.
Let us explore the conditions under which a stationary equilibrium with
perfect foresight can exist. Under such an equilibrium, we have ket+1 = kt+1 =
kt = k, and et = et 1 = et 2 = e, so that we have:
k =
s^ (w(k); R(k); w(k); R(k); e) e
h(e) + 2w(k) [h(e)]
2
` (e)
=
~s (k; e) e
h(e) + 2w(k) [h(e)]
2
` (e)
(43)
e = e^ (w(k); R(k); w(k); R(k); ~s (k; e)) = ~e (k; ~s (k; e)) (44)
where ~s (k; e)  s^ (w(k); R(k); w(k); R(k); e).
A stationary equilibrium with perfect foresight is a pair (k; e) satisfying those
two conditions. The following proposition summarizes our results.
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Proposition 4 Suppose that the existence and uniqueness conditions of Propo-
sition 2 hold. Denote the level of e satisfying e = ~e (k; ~s (k; e)) for a given k by
e = e(k). Suppose that e(0) = 0 and e0(k) > 0. Denote the level of e satisfying
h(e)

1 + 2w(k)h(e)` (e)

+ ek =
~s(k;e)
k for a given k by e = e (k). Suppose
that the level of k > 0 such that e (k) = 0 is unique. Suppose also that e(k) is
continuous in k, with e0(0) > e0(0) and e(0)  0. Then a stationary equilibrium
(kE ; eE) that satises (43) and (44) with kE > 0 exists.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Here again, it should be stressed, as in the case of Proposition 3, that the
above conditions only guarantee that there exists at least one stationary equilib-
rium with perfect foresight, but do not exclude the possibility of several station-
ary equilibrium with perfect foresight. In order to study the uniqueness of that
equilibrium, we would have to impose particular functional forms on the utility
functions, the production functions, and on relations h(e) and ` (e). Given that
the emphasis of this paper lies on the Ben Porath e¤ect, we will not carry out
the discussion on the uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium here.
5 The Ben-Porath e¤ect reexamined
Having shown that, under mild conditions, a stationary equilibrium with perfect
foresight exists in our economy, we can now turn back to the study of the Ben-
Porath e¤ect. This section reexamines the conditions under which a rise in the
lifetime horizon a¤ects the education investment. For that purpose, we consider
an economy at a stationary equilibrium with perfect foresight. Given that the
Ben-Porath e¤ect takes di¤erent forms when longevity is exogenous or when
longevity depends on the education level, we will, here again, proceed in two
cases, and consider rst the case where longevity is exogenous, and, then, the
case where longevity depends positively on education investment.
5.1 Exogenous longevity
In the case where longevity is purely exogenous, i.e. `t = `, the problem of
agents can be written as:7
max
e;s;z
u [wh(e)  eR  s] + `u

zwh(e)  v(z; `) +Rs
`

First order conditions (FOCs) of this problem are:
s : u0(c) = Ru0(d) (45)
e : u0(c) [wh0(e) R] + u0(d)zwh0(e) = 0 (46)
z : wh(e) = vz(z; `) =
z
 `
(47)
7We abstract here from time indices, since the economy is supposed to be at a stationary
equilibrium.
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Using those conditions, we can, under exogenous longevity, characterize the
stationary equilibrium with perfect foresight as follows.
Proposition 5 The stationary equilibrium under exogenous longevity is a vec-
tor (e; c; s; d; z; w;R;K;L) satisfying the conditions:
c = wh (e)  eR  s
d =
zwh (e) +Rs  v  z; `
`
u0(c) = Ru0(d)
z = wh(e) `
h0(e)
h
2 (w)
2
h(e) `+Rw
i
= R2
L = h(e)N + zh(e)N
K = N(s e)
w = FL(K;L)
R = FK(K;L)
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the FOCs of agent and from rms
competitive behavior.
Let us use those FOCs to study the conditions under which the Ben Porath
e¤ect prevails in our economy.
Using the FOC for saving, the FOC for optimal education can be rewritten
as:
wh0(e) [R+ z] = R2 (48)
and, using the FOC for retirement,
wh0(e)

R+ 2wh(e) `
 R2 =  (49)
In order to identify the e¤ect of the life horizon on the education investment,
we can compute:
de
d`
=
`
 e =
h0(e)2w2h(e)
  2w2 ` hh00(e)h(e) + [h0(e)]2i  h00(e)Rw (50)
where e < 0 because of the second-order condition.
In line with the literature on the Ben-Porath e¤ect, one usually expects that
a longer life horizon leads to a larger investment in education. Note, however,
that, in our model, we have de
d`
= 0 when  = 0, that is, when there is a
complete decay of human capital. Indeed, in that particular case, a rise in the
duration of life does not favor more education, since at the old age the return of
those educational investments are low because of the complete decay. Moreover,
when  ! 0, the marginal disutility of old age labor tends to be innite, which
implies that individuals retire at the beginning of the old age. Therefore, when
 ! 0, a rise in the time horizon has no impact on the optimal education, since
18
those additional years will not be worked. The same result would hold in case
of mandatory retirement at the beginning of the old age, implying z = 0.
Hence our calculations seem to qualify the Ben Porath e¤ect: the size of that
e¤ect depends on how large the decay of human capital is, and on how large the
marginal disutility of old age labor is. The following proposition summarizes
our results.
Proposition 6 Consider an economy with exogenous longevity at a stationary
equilibrium with perfect foresight. The impact of life horizon on the education
is given by:
de
d`
=
h0(e)2w2h(e)
  2w2 ` hh00(e)h(e) + [h0(e)]2i  h00(e)Rw
The impact of life horizon on education is:
 increasing with the square of the wage rate w
 decreasing with the square of the human capital decay 1=
 decreasing with the strength of the marginal disutility of labor 1=
Proof. See above.
The above proposition shows that the size of the Ben-Porath e¤ect depends,
in our economy, on several forces, which a¤ect the Ben-Porath e¤ect in various
ways. Some forces at work are related to preferences, such as the parameter 
capturing the disutility of old age labor. Another important determinant, which
is often neglected, consists of the extent of human capital decay . This a¤ects
the size of the Ben-Porath e¤ect signicantly. Indeed, the impact of a marginal
change in ` on education is proportional to the square of , which shows the
signicance of that parameter in the determination of the Ben-Porath e¤ect. A
simple corollary of the role of the decay is that, in societies with quicker tech-
nological progress, human capitals decay is stronger, implying, ceteris paribus,
a reduction of the size of the Ben-Porath e¤ect.
5.2 Endogenous longevity
Having studied the determinants of the Ben-Porath e¤ect in the case of exoge-
nous longevity, let us now consider the case where longevity is endogenous, and
increasing in the amount of education investment. Under endogenous longevity,
and still focusing on a stationary equilibrium with perfect foresight, the problem
of the agent can be written as:
max
e;s;z
u [wh(e)  eR  s] + ` (e)u

zwh(e)  v(z; ` (e)) +Rs
` (e)

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First-order conditions are:
s : u0(c) = Ru0(d) (51)
z : wh(e) = vz(z; ` (e)) =) z = wh(e)` (e) (52)
e : u0(c) [R  wh0(e)] = u0(d)zwh0(e) + `0 (e)

u(d)  u0(d)d
 u0(d)v`(z; ` (e))

(53)
Using those conditions, we can characterize the stationary equilibrium with
perfect foresight as follows.
Proposition 7 The stationary equilibrium under endogenous longevity is a vec-
tor (e; c; s; d; z; w;R;K;L) satisfying the conditions:
c = wh (e)  eR  s
d =
zwh (e) +Rs  v (z; `(e))
`(e)
u0(c) = Ru0(d)
z = wh(e)` (e)
Rwh0(e) + zwh0(e) +
`0 (e)
u0(d)

u(d)  u0(d)d
 u0(d)v`(z; ` (e))

= R2
L = h(e)N + zh(e)N
K = N(s e)
w = FL(K;L)
R = FK(K;L)
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the FOCs of agent and from rms
competitive behavior.
Using the FOC for saving and the notation of the fear of ruin FR  u0(d)du(d) <
1, rewrite the FOC of education as:
R2 = wh0(e) [R+ z] + `0 (et 1)dt+1

1
FR
  1

  `0 (et 1)v`(zt+1; ` (et 1))
(54)
In comparison with the case where longevity is exogenous, we have two
additional terms on the RHS. The rst additional term captures the pure e¤ect
of education on longevity, whereas the second additional term captures the e¤ect
of education on the disutility of old-age labor. Note that, since v`(z; ` (e)) < 0,
that e¤ect is positive: a higher investment in education tends, by reducing the
disutility of old-age labor, to raise lifetime welfare.
Alternatively, that condition can be written as:
R = wh0(e)
h
1 +
z
R
i
+
`0 (e) dt+1
R

1
FR
  1

  `
0(e)v`(z; ` (e))
R
(55)
Hence, at the equilibrium, the marginal cost of education R must be equal
to the marginal benets from education, which are composed of three terms:
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(1) its pure return on labor earnings; (2) its e¤ect on longevity; (3) its positive
e¤ect on the disutility of old-age labor.
As we did in the case of exogenous longevity, we can now consider whether
the Ben-Porath e¤ect remains true in our framework. For that purpose, we
consider now a displacement of the function ` (e). Let us now dene ~`(e) =
` (e).
As in (49),
wh0(e) [R+ z] + `0 (et 1)

dt+1

1
FR
  1

  v`(zt+1; ` (et 1))

= 
We want to know the value of
de
d
=

 e ;
where e < 0 from the second-order condition. In the Appendix we show that
de
d
=
h0(e)w22h(e)` (e)  `0(e)v`(z; ` (e))+`0(e)

1
FR
  1

d+ 
@d
@

 e
(56)
That formula is more complex than in the case of exogenous longevity. How-
ever, it is easy to see that, when `0 (e) tends towards 0, that expression vanishes
to the one prevailing in the case of exogenous longevity. In comparison with
that formula, two additional terms are present.
The term `0(e)v`(z; ` (e)) reects the fact that an improvement of longevity,
by reducing the extent of disutility of old-age labor, tends to make a larger in-
vestment in education more desirable. Hence, ceteris paribus, this e¤ect pushes
towards a higher investment in education. The extent of that e¤ect depends on
the marginal e¤ect of a rise in education on longevity, as well as on the form of
the disutility of old age labor function v(z; ` (e)).
The term `0(e)

1
FR
  1

d+ 
@d
@

reects the e¤ect of a favorable dis-
placement of the function ` (e) on longevity. Note that there is an e¤ect of
increasing  on the second-period consumption, @d@ . In the Appendix we show
that @d@ < 0. Intuitively, an increase in longevity has a depressive e¤ect on
the ow of consumption in the second period. This can be called a dilution
e¤ect. However, in the Appendix we show that d + @d@ > 0: the overall e¤ect
is unambiguously positive, so that this term also makes a larger investment in
education more desirable. Note also that this additional e¤ect depends on the
degree of fear of ruin FR. The higher FR is, the lower this additional e¤ect is.
It is worthy to note that, even when there is complete decay of human capital
(i.e.  = 0), or even when z = 0, an increase in  tends unambiguously to boost
education.
The following proposition summarizes our results.
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Proposition 8 Consider an economy with endogenous longevity at its station-
ary equilibrium with perfect foresight. Let us dene ~`(e) = ` (e) and consider
the impact of a displacement of the function ~`(e) by a change of . The impact
of that displacement on the education is given by:
de
d
=
h0(e)w22h(e)` (e)  `0(e)v`(z; ` (e))+`0(e)

1
FR
  1

d+ 
@d
@

 e > 0:
Proof. See the Appendix.
The determinants of the size of the Ben-Porath e¤ect are, in the case of
endogenous longevity, more numerous than in the case of exogenous longevity.
Quite importantly, due to the presence of the three additional e¤ects mentioned
above, the size of the Ben-Porath e¤ect depends now on the extent to which bet-
ter survival conditions reinforce the marginal welfare gains, in terms of a longer
life, from education investment, as well as on the extent to which education will
contribute to allow individuals to work longer, thanks to a better health. The
size of those three e¤ects depends crucially on the shape of individual prefer-
ences, in particular the degree of fear of ruin, a factor that was absent in the
case of exogenous longevity.
6 The social optimum
So far, we only considered the Ben-Porath e¤ect from a purely positive perspec-
tive. Our explorations allowed us to identify the conditions under which the
Ben-Porath e¤ect is more or less sizeable, in terms of the structural parameters
of the economy. Besides those positive issues, another important question con-
cerns the denition of the optimal public policy in an economy characterized
by some form of Ben-Porath e¤ect. The question at stake is thus: how should
governments intervene in a Ben-Porath economy? To answer that question, a
rst, necessary stage consists in characterizing the social optimum.
For that purpose, let us consider the following social planning problem. The
social planner chooses consumptions, education, retirement age and physical
capital in such a way as to maximize the sum of generational lifetime welfare
levels, subject to the resource constraint of the economy.8 That problem can be
written as:
max
ct;dt;et;zt;kt
X8><>:
t[u(ct) + `t+1 (et 1)u(dt+1)]
 t
"
ct + `t (et 2) dt + et + ~kt+1 + v (zt; `t (et 2))
 F

~kt; h(et 1) + zth(et 2)
 #
9>=>;
8 In so doing, we deliberately neglect the objection that the utilitarian approach with vari-
able longevity implies a bias towards the long-lived individuals. On this, see Pestieau and
Ponthiere (2015).
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The FOCs of that social planning problem are:
ct : 
tu0(ct) = t (57)
dt : 
t 1u0(dt) = t (58)
kt : tF~kt () = t 1 (59)
zt : vzt (zt; ` (et 2)) = FLt ()h(et 2) (60)
et : 
t+1 @`t+2
@et
u(dt+2)  t+2
@`t+2
@et
dt+2   t   t+2v`t+2 ()
@`t+2
@et
+t+1FLt+1 ()h0(et) + t+2FLt+2 ()zt+2h0(et)
= 0 (61)
Focusing on a stationary state in which t = t 1, we have:
 1 = FL ()h0(e)(1 + z) + @`
@e


d

1
FR
  1

  v` (z; ` (e))

(62)
Let FL () = w and  1 = F~k () = R: We then obtain:
R2 = wh0(e)(R+ z) +
@`
@e

d

1
FR
  1

  v` (z; ` (e))

(63)
Comparing that expression with the FOC for optimal education at the
laissez-faire, that is,
R2 = wh0(e) [R+ z] + `0

d

1
FR
  1

  v` (z; ` (e))

(64)
we can see that the social optimum can be decentralized provided the laissez-
faire capital stock corresponds to the one satisfying the Modied Golden Rule:
@F

~k; (1 + z)h

@~k
=
1

(65)
Hence, the social optimum can be decentralized by merely decentralizing the
capital stock satisfying the Modied Golden Rule. As soon as the capital stock
takes that level, then all the other variables, such as consumptions, education,
and retirement age, take their socially optimal levels. In order to understand
that result, let us remind that individual education choices at the laissez-faire do
not su¤er from particular imperfections at the level of markets or of individual
rationality (myopia, etc.). The only reason why the amount of education chosen
by individuals at the laissez-faire is not socially optimal is due to the fact that,
when the economy is in underaccumulation of capital, the cost of funding of
education is too large in comparison to what would be socially optimal, and, as
a consequence, the chosen education level is too low in comparison with what
prevails at the social optimum. As a consequence, once the capital stock takes
its Modied Golden Rule level, it follows that the interest factor R is lower,
which leads to a higher amount of education.
The following proposition summarizes our results.
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Proposition 9 The long-run social optimum is a vector (c; d; z; e; k; w;R) sat-
isfying the conditions:
u0(c) = u0(d) 1
F~k () =  1 = R
FL () = w
vz (z; ` (e)) = FL ()h(e)
R2 = wh0(e)(R+ z) +
@`
@e

d

1
FR
  1

  v` (z; ` (e))

c+ ` (e) d+ e+ ~k + v (z; ` (e)) = F

~k; h(e) + zh(e)

The long-run social optimum can be decentralized by means of a system of
intergenerational lumpsum transfers leading to the Modied Golden Rule capital
level.
Proof. See above.
7 Optimal second-best policy
Up to now, we considered an economy composed of identical individuals. Let
us now consider an economy where individuals di¤er regarding their ability to
transform educational investment into human capital. That source of hetero-
geneity can be regarded as individual di¤erences in their learning ability. We
suppose two types of individuals, di¤ering regarding their learning ability ai.
Type-1 agent exhibits a lower ability to learn than type-2 agent:
a2 > a1
In order to model this di¤erence, we will now suppose that labor income for an
individual of type i 2 f1; 2g is linear in the learning ability and in the education
level:
yi = aiei (66)
For the sake of simplicity, we now abstract from the retirement decision,
and suppose that the hourly wage and the interest factor are both equal to 1:
w = R = 1.
Let us rst look at the laissez-faire outcome. Denoting the maximum utility
level attainable at the laissez-faire allocation as a function of individual ability
ai,
U(ai)  max
ei;si
u [aiei   ei   si] + ` (ei)u

si
` (ei)

:
The FOCs are:
si : u
0(ci) = u0(di)
ei : u
0(ci) [ai   1] + `0 (ei) (u(di)  diu0(di)) = 0
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By the envelope theorem,
@U(ai)
@ai
= ei u
0
i > 0:
Therefore, type 2 ends up with higher utility than type 1. As in the conventional
scenario, the utilitarian social planner aims at redistributing income from type
2 to type 1.
In the rest of this section, we rst characterize the social optimum, under the
assumption that the learning ability of individuals cannot be easily observed by
the social planner. Given the asymmetric information on the learning ability, we
consider now a second-best social optimum. Then, we will derive the associated
second-best optimal non linear taxation scheme.
The second-best social planning problem consists in deriving, for each types
i 2 f1; 2g, baskets fxi; yi; sig that maximize social welfare, subject to the re-
source constraint of the economy, and subject to incentive constraints.9 That
planning problem can be written by means of the following Lagrangian:
L =
X
i=1;2
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
u

xi   yiai   si

+ `

yi
ai

u

si
`

yi
ai
+  (yi   xi)
+
2664 u

x2   y2a2   s2

+ `

y2
a2

u

s2
`

y2
a2

 u

x1   y1a2   s1

 `

y1
a2

u

s1
`

y1
a2

3775
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint for each
type, while  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive compatibil-
ity constraint. That constraint guarantees that individuals with a high learning
ability will not be interested in pretending to have a low learning ability.
The FOCs for optimal x1 and x2 are:
x1 : u
0(c1) = + u0(~c2) (67)
x2 : (1 + )u
0(c2) =  (68)
where ~c2  x1   y1a2   s1 .
The FOCs for optimal s1 and s2, taking account of (67), are:
s1 :  u0(c1) + u0(d1) + 
h
u0(~c2)  u0( ~d2)
i
= 0 (69)
=) u0(d1) = + u0( ~d2)
s2 : (1 + ) [ u0(c2) + u0(d1)] = 0 =) u0(d2) = u0(c2) (70)
Equation (70) shows that the Euler equation of intertemporal consumption holds
for type 2.
9We assume that si is observable and can be subject to a non-linear tax scheme.
25
On the other hand, for type 1s intertemporal consumption, c1 < ~c2 and (67)
together imply (1 )u0(c1) < . Also, y1a1 <
y1
a2
implies d1 > ~d2, so (69) implies
(1  )u0(d1) > . Therefore:
u0(c1) < u0(d1) (71)
Hence we have:
(1 + )u0(c1) = u0(d1) (72)
where  > 0. Thus the second-best optimum involves a downward distortion
on the saving of type-1 individuals, that is, of individuals with the low learning
ability.
The FOCs for optimal y1 and y2 are:
  [u0(c1)  `0 (e1) 
 (d1)]
a1
+ + 
h
u0(~c2)  `0

y1
a2




~d2
i
a2
= 0 (73)
  (1 + ) [u
0(c2)  `0 (e2) 
 (d2)]
a2
+  = 0 (74)
where 
 (di)  u(di)  diu0(di).
Given (1 + )u0(c2) = , the FOC for y2 can be written as:
1
a2

1  `0 (e2) 
 (d2)
u0(c2)

= 1 (75)
Moreover, given that u0(c1) =  + u0(~c2) and the FOC for y1, we obtain
that:

 1 + `0 (e1) 
 (d1)
u0(c1)
h1 + u0(~c2)i
a1
+1 +

u
0(~c2)
a2
241  `0y1
a2
 
 ~d2
u0(~c2)
35 = 0
(76)
Using those FOCs, it can be shown that, when individuals di¤er in their
learning ability, the non linear tax scheme implies a downward distortion on the
level of education of the less able type, and, henceforth, increases the longevity
gap between the two types.
To show this, let us denote the marginal rate of substitution MRS for type
1 and type 2 (the mimicker) by, respectively A1 and ~A2, where:
A1 

1  `
0 (e1) 
 (d1)
u0(c1)

1
a1
~A2 
241  `0 (~e2) 


~d2

u0(~c2)
35 1
a2
By assuming that the single crossing property holds, it must be the case that
~A2 < A1.
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Using the FOCs, we obtain:
1 A1 = 

u0(~c2)
h
A1   ~A2
i
(77)
It follows that A1 < 1. Using the denition of A1, this implies that:
1  `
0 (e1) 
 (d1)
u0(c1)

< a1 (78)
Hence it follows that
a1 +
`0 (e1) 
 (d1)
u0(c1)
= 1 +  (79)
where  > 0. Thus the second-best optimum involves a downward distortion on
the education of type-1 individuals, that is, of individuals with the low learning
ability.
In the light of this, the decentralization of the second-best social optimum
requires a tax Ta on the e¤ective unit of education e¤ort (y1) and a tax Tb
on saving of the individuals with low learning ability. Under such taxes, the
problem for type-1 individuals becomes:
max
y1;s1
u

y1   y1
a1
  Ta(y1)  s1   Tb(s1)

+ `

y1
a1

u
0@ s1
`

y1
a1

1A
The FOCs are:
s1 : (1 + T
0
b(s1))u
0(c1) = u0(d1) (80)
y1 : u
0(c1)

1  1
a1
  T 0a(y1)

+
1
a1
`0

y1
a1

(u(d1)  d1u0(d1)) = 0 (81)
From the last FOC, we obtain:
u0(d1)
u0(c1)
= 1 + T 0b(s1); a1 + `
0 (e1)

 (d1)
u0(c1)
= 1 + T 0a(y1)  a1 (82)
which, by setting T 0a(y1) = =a1 and T
0
b(s1) = , coincides with the condition
of the optimal level of s1 and e1 at the second-best.
The intuition behind this second-best argument for taxing the education of
individuals with low learning ability goes as follows. Given the asymmetry of
information, it is tempting for high learning ability types to pretend to have
a low learning ability, in such a way as to benet from redistribution. The
introduction of an incentive compatibility constraint allows the government to
avoid that mimicking. However, avoiding this mimicking has a cost. The only
way to discourage the mimicking of the high learning ability individuals con-
sists in taxing the education of those who claim to have low learning ability.
By doing so, the government annihilates the incentives of high learning ability
individuals to pretend to be a low learning ability type. Indeed, high learning
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ability individuals are those who most value education investment. Taxing the
good they consume most su¢ ces thus to provide them the incentives to claim
to have high learning ability, because they would not gain, under that tax, to
pretend from having a low learning ability. The intuition behind the saving tax-
ation is simple. Given that the mimickers live longer than true type 1, taxing
their second-period consumption (again, the good preferred by the mimicker)
discourages their incentives to claim to have low learning ability.
The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 10 Consider an economy with two types of individuals, di¤ering
in their learning ability.
Under asymmetric information, the optimal non linear tax scheme implies
a downward distortion on the level of education and saving of the less able type.
This downward distortion contributes to increase the gaps on longevity and
saving between the two types.
Proof. See above.
The second part of that proposition is counterintuitive: the second-best
optimal policy involves to raise the longevity gap between the two types of
agents, which seems paradoxical. However, this surprising fact follows from the
postulated relation between education and longevity. Given that relation, it is
impossible to distort the education of the low ability type downwards without
also reducing their longevity, which contributes to raise longevity inequalities
between types.
8 Concluding remarks
In the recent years, a large attention was paid to the study of the Ben-Porath
e¤ect, according to which a rise in life expectancy will, by increasing the lifetime
return of education, contribute to encourage education. The present paper pro-
posed to reexamine the Ben-Porath e¤ect in an OLG economy where individuals
choose their education, their saving and when they retire, and where education
investments do not only raise future wages - possibly with some decay - but
contribute also to raise longevity.
Our main results are the following. First, we emphasized that the Ben-
Porath e¤ect varies strongly depending on whether we consider an economy
with exogenous or with endogenous longevity. This fact could have been guessed
from the literature, but this paper proposes a comparison of those two kinds of
Ben-Porath e¤ects within the same theoretical setting. This comparison allowed
us to highlight that, in both cases, the strength of the Ben-Porath e¤ect depends
on the future wages, the marginal return of education, the strength of the decay
in human capital, as well as on the marginal disutility of old-age labor.
That comparison emphasized also some di¤erences: once the feedback e¤ect
is introduced (i.e. endogenous longevity), the size of the Ben-Porath e¤ect de-
pends on a particular aspect of preferences - the fear of ruin - which does not
enter the Ben Porath e¤ect under exogenous longevity. Individual heterogeneity
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in their attitude towards risk may thus explain part of the mixed results con-
cerning the empirical validation of the Ben Porath e¤ect. The comparison also
highlighted the presence of an additional e¤ect under endogenous longevity: the
fact that a rise in life expectancy may also reduce the disutility of old age labor,
which, in turn, may increase even more the rise in education returns obtained
through the increase in life expectancy.
On the normative side, our analyses highlighted that the long-run social op-
timum can be decentralized, within our economy, by merely decentralizing the
Modied Golden Rule capital level. Such a decentralization, by reducing the
interest rate, will also reduce the cost of education funding, and, hence, will
induce the socially optimal level of education. We also considered a modied
framework with heterogeneity on learning ability, and we showed that it is op-
timal, under asymmetric information on learning ability, to distort downwards
the education of the low ability type, which will deter high ability types from
mimicking low ability type, but at the cost of raising the longevity gap between
the two types of individuals.
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10 Appendix
10.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The rst part of the proposition follows from the FOCs and the conditions for
prot maximization of rms in a competitive economy. The second part of the
proposition can be proved as follows.
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Suppose et 1 = 0. Then the marginal welfare gain from extending education
is, under limet 1!0 h
0 (et 1) = +1,
lim
et 1!0
h0(et 1)
h
2
 
wet+1
2
 `+Ret+1wt
i
= +1 > Ret+1Rt
so that the marginal welfare gain from increasing education exceeds the mar-
ginal welfare loss from increasing education, implying that et 1 = 0 cannot be
optimal.
Suppose et 1 = +1. Then the marginal welfare gain from extending edu-
cation is, under limet 1!+1 h
0 (et 1) = 0,
lim
et 1!+1
h0(et 1)
h
2
 
wet+1
2
h(et 1) `+Ret+1wt
i
= 0 < Ret+1Rt
so that the marginal welfare gain from increasing education is inferior to the
marginal welfare loss from increasing education, implying that et 1 = +1
cannot be optimal.
Given that the marginal welfare gain from increasing education exceeds the
marginal welfare loss from increasing education at et 1 = 0, and given that
the marginal welfare gain from increasing education is inferior to the marginal
welfare loss from increasing education when et 1 tends to +1, it follows, by
continuity, that there must exist an interior optimal education level.
Regarding the uniqueness of that optimal education level, note that the
derivative of the LHS of the FOC wrt et 1 is:
h00(et 1)
h
2
 
wet+1
2
h(et 1) `+Ret+1wt
i
+ [h0(et 1)]
2
h
2
 
wet+1
2
 `
i
We can rewrite that expression as:h
2
 
wet+1
2
 `
i h
h00(et 1)h(et 1) + [h0(et 1)]
2
i
+ h00(et 1)Ret+1wt
The rst term may be either positive or negative. The second term is nega-
tive. Monotonicity of the LHS arises whenh
h00(et 1)h(et 1) + [h0(et 1)]
2
i
< 0
for all et 1, so that the rst term and the second term are both negative. That
condition can be written as:
jh00(et 1)jh(et 1) > [h0(et 1)]2
10.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The rst part of the proposition follows from the FOCs and the conditions for
prot maximization of rms in a competitive economy. The second part of the
proposition can be proved as follows.
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Suppose et 1 = 0. Then the marginal welfare gain from extending education
is, under limet 1!0 h
0 (et 1) = +1 and limet 1!0 `0 (et 1) = +1,
lim
et 1!0
h0(et 1)
h
2
 
wet+1
2
`+Ret+1wt
i
+
`0 (et 1)
u0(dt+1)

u(dt+1)  u0(dt+1)dt+1
 u0(dt+1)v`(zt+1; `)

= +1 > Ret+1Rt
so that the marginal welfare gain from increasing education exceeds the mar-
ginal welfare loss from increasing education, implying that et 1 = 0 cannot be
optimal.
Suppose et 1 = +1. Then the marginal welfare gain from extending edu-
cation is, under limet 1!+1 h
0 (et 1) = 0 and limet 1!+1 `
0 (et 1) = 0,
lim
et 1!+1
h0(et 1)
h
2
 
wet+1
2
h(et 1) `+Ret+1wt
i
+
`0 (et 1)
u0(dt+1)

u(dt+1)  u0(dt+1)dt+1
 u0(dt+1)v`(zt+1; `)

= 0 < Ret+1Rt
so that the marginal welfare gain from increasing education is inferior to the
marginal welfare loss from increasing education, implying that et 1 = +1
cannot be optimal.
Given that the marginal welfare gain from increasing education exceeds the
marginal welfare loss from increasing education at et 1 = 0, and given that
the marginal welfare gain from increasing education is inferior to the marginal
welfare loss from increasing education when et 1 tends to +1, it follows, by
continuity, that there must exist an interior optimal education level.
Regarding the uniqueness of that optimal education level, note that the
derivative of the LHS of the FOC wrt et 1 is:
h00(et 1)
h
2
 
wet+1
2
h(et 1)` (et 1) +Ret+1wt
i
+h0(et 1)
h
2
 
wet+1
2
h0(et 1)` (et 1) + 2
 
wet+1
2
h(et 1)`0 (et 1)
i
+`00 (et 1)

dt+1

1
FR
  1

  v`(zt+1; ` (et 1))

(83)
+`0 (et 1)

 v``(zt+1; ` (et 1))`0 (et 1) v`z(zt+1; ` (et 1))zt+1

h0(et 1)
h(et 1)
+
`0(et 1)
`(et 1)

+`0(et 1)

1
FR
  1

@dt+1
@et 1
For the fourth term of (83), since v`() =   z22`2 ,  v``() v`z()  z` =   z
2
`3 +
z
`2  z` = 0. Taking account of zt+1 = wet+1h(et 1)`(e), the fourth term is
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equal to `0 (et 1)v`z(zt+1; ` (et 1))zt+1 h
0(et 1)
h(et 1)
= 2(wet+1)
2h(et 1)h0(et 1)`0(et 1).
Therefore, (83) can be rewritten as:
2
 
wet+1
2

h
h00(et 1)h(et 1)` (et 1) + (h0(et 1))
2
` (et 1) + 2h0(et 1)h(et 1)`0 (et 1)
i
+h00(et 1)Ret+1wt
+`00 (et 1)

dt+1

1
FR
  1

  v`(zt+1; ` (et 1))

+`0(et 1)

1
FR
  1

@dt+1
@et 1
The second term is negative. The third term is negative when 1
FR
> 1. For
the fourth term, dt+1 =
zt+1w
e
t+1h(et 1) v(zt+1;`(et 1))+Rt+1st
`(et 1)
=
2(wet+1)
2(h(et 1))2
2 +
Ret+1st
`(et 1)
. At this point we need to take account that et 1 changes st through
 u0(wth (et 1) et 1Rt st)+Ret+1u0

2(wet+1)
2(h(et 1))2
2 +
Ret+1st
`(et 1)

= 0. Mak-
ing use ofRt wth0(et 1) = 1Ret+1 [
2(wet+1)
2h0(et 1)h(et 1)`(et 1)+`0(et 1)dt+1
 
1
FR
  1
  `0(et 1)v`(z; ` (e))], we have:
@st+1
@et 1
=  `(et 1)
Ret+1
2(wet+1)
2h0(et 1)h(et 1) (84)
+
`0 (et 1)
 u00(ct)  (R
e
t+1)
2
`(et 1)
u00(dt+1)
24 u00(ct)Ret+1  dt+1   1FR   1  v`(z; ` (et 1))
  (R
e
t+1)
2stu
00(dt+1)
(`(et 1))2
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@dt+1
@et 1
= 2(wet+1)
2h0(et 1)h(et 1) +
Ret+1
`(et 1)

@st
@et 1
  `
0(et 1)
`(et 1)
st

(85)
=
`0 (et 1)
 u00(ct)  (R
e
t+1)
2
`(et 1)
u00(dt+1)
"
u00(ct)
`(et 1)
 
dt+1
 
1
FR
  1  v`(z; ` (et 1))
+
Ret+1u
00(ct)st
(`(et 1))2
#
< 0:
Hence, a su¢ cient condition for the uniqueness of the optimal education level
is:
h00(et 1)h(et 1)` (et 1) + (h0(et 1))
2
` (et 1) + 2h0(et 1)h(et 1)`0 (et 1) < 0
That condition, which guarantees the monotonicity of the LHS, can be writ-
ten as:
jh00(et 1)jh(et 1)` (et 1) > (h0(et 1))2 ` (et 1) + 2h0(et 1)h(et 1)`0 (et 1)
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10.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Under a stationary equilibrium with perfect foresight, we have ket+1 = kt+1 =
kt = k, and et = et 1 = et 2 = e, so that we have:
k =
S (w(k); R(k); w(k); R(k)) e
h(e) + 2w(k) [h(e)]
2
 `

~S (k) e
h(e) + 2w(k) [h(e)]
2
 `
(86)
e  e (w(k); R(k); w(k); R(k))  e (k) (87)
A stationary equilibrium with perfect foresight is a pair (e; k) satisfying
those two conditions. To examine the existence of such a pair, let us study
some properties of those two relations.
Take the rst one. This equality can be rewritten as:
k =
~S (k) e
h(e) + 2w(k) [h(e)]
2
 `
() k
h
h(e) + 2w(k) [h(e)]
2
 `
i
= ~S (k) e
() h(e) 1 + 2w(k) [h(e)]  ` = ~S (k) e
k
~S(k) e
k is a ratio: saving per young worker net of borrowing for education in-
vestment, divided by capital per e¤ective labor unit. Denote the solution of
h(e)

1 + 2w(k) [h(e)]  `

=
~S(k) e
k as e = e (k), that is, the level of e such that
h(e)

1 + 2w(k) [h(e)]  `

=
~S(k) e
k holds for a given k. Suppose that the level
of k such that e (k) = 0 is unique and positive, and e0 (k) < 0.
Take now (87). We rst show that e0(k) > 0. Evaluated at the steady-state,
equation (32) is:
wh0(e)

R+ 2wh(e) `
 R2   = 0: (88)
We can compute:
de
dk
=
k
 e =
h0(e)(22w(k)w0(k)h(e) `+Rw0(k) + f 00(k)w(k))  2f 00(k)R
 e
(89)
e < 0 because of the second-order condition, so that the denominator of the
above formula is positive. As for the numerator, w0(k) =  kf 00(k) > 0 from
(11), and  f 00(k) > 0. Also, h0(e)f 00(k)w(k)  f 00(k)R = f 00(k) [h0(e)w(k) R].
From (88), h02w2h0(e)h(e) `=R < 0, so that h0(e)f 00(k)w(k)  f 00(k)R > 0. We
then conclude that de=dk > 0.
We next show that e(0) = 0. The formula of  = 0 can be rearranged to:
h0(e)2(w(k))2h(e) `= f 0(k) [f 0(k)  h0(e)w(k)] : (90)
limk!0 w(k) = limk!0(f(k)   f 0(k)k) = 0. If limk!0 f 0(k) = +1, then the
above equality cannot hold at k = 0 unless e = 0. So e(0) = 0 has to be the
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case. We therefore obtained an increasing relationship between e and k, passing
through (k; e) = (0; 0).
Let ka > 0 be the value such that e (ka) = 0. Given ka > 0 and e0(k) > 0, it
follows that e (ka) < e (ka). On the other hand, by e0(0) > e0(0) and e(0)  0,
there must exist k such that e(k) > e
 
k

. Hence, by continuity, there must
exist an intersection of e = e(k) and e = e(k), namely, a pair (k; e) satisfying
both conditions. Hence we proved existence of a stationary equilibrium with
perfect foresight.
10.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Under a stationary equilibrium with perfect foresight, we have ket+1 = kt+1 =
kt = k, and et = et 1 = et 2 = e, so that we have:
k =
s^ (w(k); R(k); w(k); R(k); e) e
h(e) + 2w(k) [h(e)]
2
` (e)
=
~s (k; e) e
h(e) + 2w(k) [h(e)]
2
` (e)
(91)
e = e^ (w(k); R(k); w(k); R(k); ~s (k; e)) = ~e (k; ~s (k; e)) (92)
where ~s (k; e)  s^ (w(k); R(k); w(k); R(k); e).
To examine the existence of such a pair, let us study some properties of those
two relations. Take the rst one. This equality can be rewritten as:
k =
~s (k; e) e
h(e) + 2w(k) [h(e)]
2
` (e)
() k
h
h(e) + 2w(k) [h(e)]
2
` (e)
i
= ~s (k; e) e
() h(e) 1 + 2w(k)h(e)` (e) = ~s (k; e) e
k
Let us denote the solution of h(e)

1 + 2w(k)h(e)` (e)

= ~s(k;e) ek as e = e (k),
that is, the level of e such that h(e)

1 + 2w(k)h(e)` (e)

= ~s(k;e) ek holds for
a given k.
Take the second relation. That equality can be rewritten as:
e = ~e (k; ~s (k; e))
Denote by e = e(k) the solution of e = ~e (k; ~s (k; e)), that is, the level of e such
that e = ~e (k; ~s (k; e)) holds for a given k. There are good reasons to believe that
e(k) is increasing in k. Clearly, a higher k implies a higher wage, and thus higher
marginal returns from education, as well as a lower interest factor, implying a
lower marginal cost of education. Assuming that e0 (k) > 0 and e (0) = 0, e(k)
is an increasing relationship passing through (k; e) = (0; 0).
Let ka > 0 be the value such that e (ka) = 0. Given ka > 0 and e0(k) > 0, it
follows that e (ka) < e (ka). On the other hand, by e0(0) > e0(0) and e(0)  0,
there must exist k such that e(k) > e
 
k

. Hence, by continuity, there must
exist an intersection of e = e(k) and e = e(k), namely, a pair (k; e) satisfying
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both conditions. Hence we proved existence of a stationary equilibrium with
perfect foresight.
10.5 Proof of Proposition 8
The formula of e is (83) in the proof of Proposition 2, evaluated at the sta-
tionary equilibrium. When `0(e) = 0, the value of  e is equivalent to the
denominator of (50).
Recall that z = wh(e)` (e), and also our assumption that FR is constant.
We have:
 = h
0(e)w22h(e)` (e) +`0(e)

1
FR
  1

d+ 
@d
@

  `0(e)v`(z; ` (e))
 `0 (e) [`(e)v``(z; ` (e)) + zv`z(z; ` (e)]:
As for the last term in the above equation, since v`() =   z22`2 , v``()  ` = z
2
`2
and v`z()  z =   z2`2 , so that `(e)v``(z; ` (e)) + zv`z(z; ` (e)) = 0. Therefore,
the above equation is identical to the numerator of (56).
We have d = zwh(e) v(z;`(e))+Rs`(e) =
2w2(h(e))2
2 +
Rs
`(e) . Taking account
that  changes s through  u0(wh (e) eR s)+Ru0

2w2(h(e))2
2 +
Rs
`(e)

= 0,
@s
@
=
R2
`(e)u
00(d)
u00(c) + (R)
2
`(e)u
00(d)
s

;
and thus,
@d
@
=
R
`(e)

@s
@
  s


=
 u00(c)
u00(c) + (R)
2
`(e)u
00(d)
Rs
2`(e)
< 0:
Therefore,
d+ 
@d
@
 Rs
`(e)
+ 
@d
@
=
Rs
`(e)
R2
`(e)u
00(d)
u00(c) + (R)
2
`(e)u
00(d)
> 0:
Hence we conclude that all the terms in the numerator of (56) are positive.
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